6.3. SR 03-21-2011ITEM 6.3.
Kiver
MEMORANDUM
TO: City Council
FROM: Jeremy Barnhart, Planning Manager
DATE: March 2 I , 20 I I
SUBJECT: Extension of the Interim Use Permit for the Store Building at Wapiti
Park, Case No. 10- 16
At its meeting in January, Council reviewed the conditions applied to Wapiti Park in the
Interim Use received on August 2, 2010. Specifically, one of the conditions was the review
and approval of a plan to address the items outlined in the remaining conditions.
At that meeting, the attorney for Wapiti had comments on many of the findings identified by
staff. Based on these comments, Council directed the city attorney Peter Beck to review
Wapiti's comments and report back in March.
Attached are the comments from Wapiti's attorney as well as Mr. Beck's response to these
comments.
C:\Users\jjohnson\AppData\I,ocal\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.0utlook\SFWAYSNS\CU 10-1G Wapiti
Park update for Council 3-21-11.doc
Page 1 of 1
Beck, Peter K.
From: Jim Robin (JRobin@wayzatalawgroup.com]
Sent: Thursday, January 27, 2011 5:18 PM
To: shortshots17@aol,com
Cc: Beck, Peter K.
Subject: White and Wapiti Park Campgrounds, Inc.
Attachments: Presentation to Elk River City Council with Annotations.pdf
Dear Mayor Dietz,
Enclosed, pursuant to your request is a typed version of my presentation notes with annotations
referencing the case law, statutes, ordinances and Attorney General Opinions in support of our
positions. Can I count on you to duplicate this and provide copies to the other members of the City
Council? I will provide a copy to Mr. Beck by copying him on this email.
Jim Robin
James G. Robin
Wayzata Law Group LLC
Suite 170
1907 East Wayzata Blvd.
Wayzata, MN 55391
952.475.0987 (Direct)
952.476.4447 (Fax)
jrob__n q~wayzatal,awgoup_,cQm
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damage arising from receipt or use of this communication or its attachments.
2/1 /2011
Annotated Notes on January 18t1i P><•esentation to Elk River City Council
Honorable Mayor and Councilors, my name is James Robin of Wayzata Law Group.
Wayzata Law Group represents Lorraine White and Wapiti Park Campgrounds, loc. For
purposes of adding to the formal record I would like to clarify the positions of my clients
with respect to the proposed findings o1' fact assembled by city staff:
My clients generally agree with proposed tindiugs numbered 1 through 4, but want to point
out that when the campground became a legal, nonconforming use as a result of flue
rezoning referred to in Finding 4, my clients' use rights were exactly what they were before
the adoption of the zoning code in 1980 and before the CUI' Was issued in 1984. My clients
were entitled to continue to operate the campground, subject to State licensure
requirements, but free of the conditions attaclued to the previous CUl'.
o White and Wapiti Nark lose their status as a legal, nonconforming use only through abandonment.
o Abandonment occurs only when there is intent to abandon and there is sung overt act ur litilure to act
indicating the owner no hmger claims a right to the nonconforming use.
0 Bee County of ]sand v. Peterson, 4(i9 N. W.2d 4G7, 470 (Minn.App.1991) and see also Peacock'fp. V.
Panetta, 81 Mich. App. 733, 2G5 N. W.2d 8 [ 0 (I 978).
o The city has acknowledged Wapiti's status as a legal, nonconforming use, unencumbered by
conditions. (Sec: Director of Planning, Michele Met'herson's Memorandum to Mayor and City
Council (April 12, 2000)}.
o Counsel Ior the city is also on record acknowledging status as a legal, nonconforming use.
o The city has never mught to enforce the conditions associated with the 1984 CUP, nor has it reviewed
the slants every two years as provided in the purpot•ted conditions.
o Any attempt to argue that the 1984 antcfilions continue to apply is disingenuous and barred by
principles of estoppel
With respect to proposed finding number S, we do not agree that Elk River ordinances
"did not allow the reconstruction." It is our position that the value of the destroyed
building, which served as an accessory use, Was far less than 50°/p of flue total integrated
value of the fifty-one acre campground. We believe Elk ]fiver had no authority to prevent
reconstructionu and acted improperly and without authority in requiring an application for
a CUP and again acted improperly and without authority in unilaterally treat'uuug the CUP
application as an application for an IUP.
o See Wertog v. Milwaukee Mul. fns. Co., 4l5 N.W,2d 370, 373-374 (Mitts. App. 1987);
o See E3ttss v. Johnson, fi24 N.W.2d 781 (Minn. App. 2001) {interpreting a statute similar to IIk Kiver's
Ordinance Q 900.34, Subd. 9 and concluding that the value of the destroyed building must be compared
to tJte value of an entire integrated nonconforming use „hen determining the percentage o1'destruction
of a nonconforming building).
o Sec also fetter v, Holheins, 190 Misc. 99, 70 N.Y.S.2d 808 (Sup 1947); Application ol'Richards, 41
Misc. 2d 850, 24G N.Y.S.2d 746 (Sup 1962); and Patricia E. Salkin, American Law ol'loning § 12.G2
(5i0 ed. 2010).
We agree with proposed finding number 6, except for the portion that describes why the
city unilaterally treated the CUP applicationu as an IUP application and the portion
indicating the likely sate or development within IO years.
o The property owner, Loraine White, never made any such representation.
o Ii was irresponsible of the city to suggest that a cilixen build a building designed to lass for fifty or
sixty years with a limitation often years on the cifizen's right to use the building.
We also point out that the ZUUO IU1' was issued with t-nly two conditions, as opposed to the
seventeen that the city seeks to impose on renewal.
We believe that the first condition to the 200U IUI', ("~t~he approval is valid for ten years,
until the property is redeveloped, or until ownership oi' the property is transferred,
whichever comes first"} was an illegal condition.
o No Minnesota Statute Gives a city authority I'or termination of a permit on redevelopment or lransl'er oi'
ownership.
o No part of the Elk River zoning code gives any authority for termination of a permit an redevelopment
or transfer of ownership.
a A provision for termination of a permit on redevelopment ar transfer o1'ownership was unreasonable
and unrelated to the use of the building.
o See and Patricia I;. Salkin, American law of 7..oning § 14.33 (5'~` ed. 2010);
o Sec also Room attd 13d. biomes and Family Care Hoiues, Operators mid Owners v. Gribbs, 67 Mich.
App. 381, 241 N.W.2d 216 (197G).
We agree with proposed finding number 7, but state that the permit expiration date was
April 17, 2010. We also want to make a record that on March 15, 2UlU, the Ellc River City
Council adopted Ordinance 10-03 amending §3U-G58. Ordinance IU-U3 was etl'ective ot>I
April 3, 2010 and resulted in the use of the building l)y Wall)Itl agf11i1 becotlling a ICgal,
nonconforming use with full privilege to be continued as a legal, ttonconformittig use,
without further need of an IU1' or CUI'.
o See L'lk River City Cade § 30-691,
o See Elk River City ('ode~~' 30-701.
o Sec M.S.A. fi 462.357, Subd.(I)(e).
We agree wiHi proposed finding number 8, but claim that such: application was solely the
II•esult of wrongful action by the city in telling my clients they could not legacy use the
building and that they would not be eligible for a renewal of their liquor licenses.
We agree with proposed finding number 9, but claim that Wapiti's right to use the building
is not dependent on the lU ,year lUl', but instead upon its right to continue the legal,
nonconforming use created by the coning ordinance amendment on April 3, 2UIU.
o See Elk River City Code § 30-b91.
o See lslk River City Code § 30-701.
o See M.S.A.{ 462.357, Subd.(1)(e).
Even ii' Wapiti needed the IUP, we believe that all of tl>ic imposed conditions arc illegal and
unenforceable by reason of one or more of the following:
A. Tlie conditions attempt to illegally regulate the legal, nonconforming recreational
campground use and constitute an uncompensated taking of valuable property
rights of White and Wapiti.
o See MN Stat.l 17.184.
o Sternaman v Mcllenry County, 454 P.Supp. 240 (N.U.lll. 1978).
l3. Tl~e conditions are arbih•at•y, capricious and have no relation to the use of the
building as an offcce, restaurant, bar, laundry and gathering place.
o See Sternaman v. McHenry County, 454 F.Supp. 240 (N.D. Ill. 1978}.
o See also Summit School v. Neugenl, 82 A.D2d 463, 442 N.Y.S.2d 73 (2d Dep't 1981).
o See also Patricia E. Salkin, American Law of Zoning ti 14.31 - 14.32 (5`~' ed. 2010).
C. Mr. Barnhart's letter of July K, 2010, listed only 4 conditions, none of which were
relevant or material to the use of the bui{ding:
o I .That the park's septic system be verified as appropriate for winter use;
0 2. That a Manure Management Plan for the park be submitted;
0 3. That a Debris Management be developed for the park; and
0 4. That the park be closed from January I" iln•ough March I" of each year.
I). The regulation of campgrounds has been preempted by the State of Minnesota and
delegated to the MN Ileaith Dept.
o See Board of Sup'rs of Croaks "fp.,l2enville County v. ValAdCo, 504 N. W.2d 267 (Minn. App. 1993).
o See M.S.A. 327.IG, Subd. I.
o See nps. Atty. Gen., 238i and G24d-8
o See also State v. Kuhlman, 722 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn.App.2006), review granted {Mimi. l)ec. 12, 2UOG).
E. The Clk River ordinances do not authorize the council, in granting an lUN', to make
it subject to termination if certain agreements are not reached by a later date.
o See L'Ik River City Code ~ 30-G58, Subd.(b}(6) and (7); and
o See M.S.A. § 4G2.3597, Subd.{2)(4).
F. The Council's action of approving a l(1 year lUl', but making it subject to
termination if the city and applicant do nut reach a future agreement, is in violation of
M.S.A. § 15.99 (tltic 60 day rule), M.S.A. § 462.3597, Subd.{2)(4), tl:e I?Ik 12iver City
Code § 30-6513, and denies my clients of the protection intended by M.S.A. § 15.99.
o See M.S.A.~~' 15.99;
o See M.S.A.~~'' 462,3597, Subd.(2)(4); and
o See Glk River City Code ~ 30-658, Subd.{b)(C}and (7).
]f the city terminates Wapiti's lUP and liquor licenses its action will constitute a regulatcn•y
taking of valuable property rights, exposing the city to a claim for damages.
o See M.S.A. ~ 1 17,187.
Elk River's ordinances set forth no procedure 1'or the revocation of an lUl'. Both Ms.
White and Wapiti will have been denied substantive acid procedural due process, 31' the city
revokes the lUl', without an authorized procedure fa• doing so.
The definition cited in proposed finding t:wnber 12 is specifically limited it: application to
use within specific sections of the statute.
o See M.S.A. § 327.14, Subd. 7.
Proposed finding number l3 completely misstates the stature. Chapter 327.14, Subd. 8,
states that a Recreatio~tal Camping Area means, "an area used on a daily, nightly, weekly
or longer basis". It does not use tltie word `temporary' in defining 12ecreational Camping
Area.
o See M.S.A. 327.14 Subd. 8.
Proposed finding uunil~er IS is neither relevant nor material to the lUP for use of the
building.
With respect to proposed finding number 15, city staff' has never, defined what it means by
"permanent residents." Most of the residents referred to by city staff on prior occasions as
"permanent" have since moved out, clearly demonsh•atiisg that they were taot "permanent"
residents.
Proposed finding number l6(a) is not only false, but also irrelevant and immaterial to the
IUP for the use of the building.
Proposed finding numbers Ib(b) & {c) arc neither rclev~uit nor material to the lUl' for the
use of the building.
Proposed finding number 1G(d) is a mere allegatia~, which has not been previously
communicated to my clients, and is ncithcr relevant nor material to the lUl' for the use of
the building.
Proposed iinding number 1G(e) expresses concerns, but offers no proof of any condition
that justifies a concern.
Proposed finding number l6(f) expresses concerns, but offers no evidence to which ttty
clients might offer rebuttal.
Proposed finding number 17 is untrue: The City Council's August 2"'~ grant oi'thc lUl'
contained sevc~iteen conditions, not seven. Perhaps more impok•tantly, my clients have
complied with hvelve of the seventeen.
o They have maintained all state licenses;
o 'They have provided written testimony regar(ling the functionality of the septic system;
0 They have pointed out to staff that Section i 0-9 of the I"slk River City Code does not provide for at
manure management plan;
o 'T'hey arc incompliance with aft violations identified by the health inspector, wtth U)c excepunn nl one.
They have been given an extension by the 1)calth inspector to put ol'f fixing some broken tiles until the
spring;
o The Private Road agreement exists;
o The maximum number ofcampsites has not been exceeded;
o The how's oi'operation sue beiFtg complied with;
o Only minor maintenance and repairs are permitted;
o The store is used primarily fi)r campers;
o 'fhe horses do not constitute a nuisance;
o The provisions of Minnesota stahdes fu)d the Minnesota Depru•tmenE ol• I•lealth arc being complic(I
with; and
o The wheels arc on aU trnilcrs.
Ms. White, Ms. Glenn and Wapiti want to be good individual and corporate citizens. They
want to operate their business in a reasonabie, responsible and legal manner. They want to
cooperate with the Council, the l'#a~aning Commission, the Police and city staff. 'T'hey want
the protections, saieguaE•ds and services that they are entitled to as taxpayers, citizens and
business owners. iiut none of this can happen if the city tries to take away their vested
rights Fvithout compensation and without procedw•al and substantive due process.
We would like to avoid litigation that would be costly for both sides, but can do so only if
the city allows the IUP to continue without the onerous conditions currently being pushed.
4
MEMORANDUM
TO: Mayor John Dietz and Members of the City Council
FROM: Peter Beck, City Attorney
DATE: March 18, 2011
RE: Wapiti Park
This memorandum is in response to the Council's request that I address the points made
by counsel for Wapiti Park at the January 18, 2011 Elk River City Council meeting.
Counsel for Wapiti Park subsequently sent Mayor Dietz an email dated January 27, 2011
with an attachment entitled "Annotated Notes on January 18 Presentation to Elk River
City Council." This memorandum will address the major issues raised in that attachment,
generally in the order they are raised in the attachment.
First, some background. Wapiti Park is zoned R-lb and was issued a conditional use
permit (CUP) in 1984. Subsequent to approval of the CUP, the city's zoning ordinance
was amended such that campgrounds are no longer a conditional use in the R-lb zoning
district. In 1999, the Wapiti Park store building burned down. In 2000, aten-year
interim use permit (IUP) was approved to rebuild the store building. The ten-year IUP
has expired, and Wapiti Park has applied for a new IUP for the store building for an
additional ten years.
To operate as it is currently, Wapiti Park:
• must be a lawful use;
• must have a valid IUP for the store building;
• must have the necessary licenses for liquor sales; and
• must have a valid campground permit from the Minnesota Department of
Health.
Although related, the only approval before the City Council at this time is the IUP for the
store building.
1. Wapiti Park argues that the zoning ordinance amendment which eliminated
campgrounds as a conditional use eliminated any obligation of Wapiti Park to comply
with the conditions of its 1984 CUP.
I find no authority to support that position. When the zoning ordinance was amended to
eliminate campgrounds as a conditional use, Wapiti Park was a legal use so long as it
complied with the conditions of its CUP. Therefore, it became a legal nonconforming
use subject to its CUP and compliance with the conditions set forth in the CUP.
Minnesota Statutes, Sec. 462.3595, Subdivision 3, provides that:
A conditional use permit shall remain in effect as long as the conditions agreed
upon are observed, but nothing in this section shall prevent the municipality from
enacting or amending official controls to change the status of conditional uses.
Pursuant to this Statute, the city was within its rights to amend its ordinance to eliminate
campgrounds as a conditional use, but Wapiti Park retained the right to its CUP, "as long
as the conditions agreed upon are observed." If the ordinance had not been amended,
Wapiti Park would be obligated to comply with the conditions of its CUP, the CUP
would be valid for as long as the conditions agreed upon were observed, and the CUP
could be subject to revocation if the conditions agreed upon were not observed.
Following the ordinance amendment, Wapiti Park became a legal nonconforming use
subject to its CUP which, pursuant to the Statute, remained in effect as long as the
conditions agreed upon are observed. Failure to comply with the conditions in the CUP
still subject the CUP to revocation, just as it would if the ordinance had not been
amended.
2. Wapiti Park argues that it can only lose its nonconforming use status through
abandonment, citing the case of County of Isanti v. Peterson, 469 N.W.2d 467 (Minn.
App. 1991).
In fact, that case specifically held that proof of abandonment is not required and that the
right to continue a nonconforming use can be terminated by discontinuance. However,
that is not the situation here. In this instance, the issue is that Wapiti Park's legal
nonconforming use status is tied to its CUP. Without the CUP, it would not be a legal
nonconforming use and would have no nonconforming use rights.
3. Wapiti Park argues that the city had no authority to require an IUP for
reconstruction of the store building in 2000, arguing that the destroyed building was less
than 50% of the total value of the campground.
However, the IUP was not issued for the campground. The campground has a CUP
which, as noted above, remains in effect so long as the conditions agreed upon in the
CUP are observed. The IUP was issued for the store building, and the issue before the
City Council is whether to renew the IUP for the store building for an additional ten
years.
4. In addition to arguing that the city had no authority to require an application for
either a CUP or an IUP in 2000, Wapiti Park argues that the city unilaterally treated their
application for a CUP as an IUP application.
As staff has pointed out in the staff reports, at the time the store building burned down in
2000, city code did not allow the reconstruction of a nonconforming use, even a legal
nonconforming use. Although operation of the campground could continue pursuant to
2
the CUP, the destroyed building could not be rebuilt. City staff suggested an IUP as a
way to allow reconstruction of the store building. Wapiti Park agreed to that approach,
accepted the IUP when it was approved, and expressed no objection to the IUP for its
entire duration often years.
5. Wapiti Park argues that the ten-year term of the IUP is invalid because no
Minnesota Statute gives the city authority for termination of a permit.
In fact, Minnesota Statutes, Sec. 462.3597, gives the city express authority to allow
interim uses, and to set conditions on interim uses. The Statute defines an interim use as,
"a temporary use of property until a particular date, until the occurrence of a particular
event, or until zoning regulations no longer permit it." (Emphasis added.) This Statute
gives the city express authority to issue an IUP allowing the temporary use of property
until a particular date, including ten years from the date of the issuance.
6. Wapiti Park argues that the city's Apri12010 amendment of its interim use
ordinance resulted in Wapiti Park's building become a legal nonconforming use without
further need of an IUP or CUP, citing Sections 30-691 and 30-701 of the city code and
Minnesota Statutes, Sec. 462.357, Subdivision (1)e.
The Statute cited is the 2004 amendment of the Municipal Planning Act which allows for
the repair and replacement of nonconforming uses. The city code sections are the city's
corresponding nonconforming use section. Neither the Statute nor the code sections
provide that an ordinance amendment wipes out existing CUPs and IUPs. As pointed out
above, when a legal use becomes nonconforming, it is a legal nonconforming use subject
to the approvals that made it a legal use. Wapiti Park has cited no Statutes or case law
which would support their position that an amendment of the city code frees them from
the terms of their IUP or CUP. The fact of a zoning ordinance amendment does not
eliminate a CUP, the conditions set forth in the CUP, or the date for expiration of an IUP.
7. Wapiti Park argues that the conditions recommended by staff are illegal because
they constitute an uncompensated taking of valuable property rights.
Nobody has proposed a physical taking of Wapiti Park or any portion thereof. If Wapiti
Park's argument is that the imposition of conditions in a CUP and/or an IUP constitute a
regulatory taking, the facts in this instance would not support such a claim. To establish
a regulatory taking of property, the owner must establish that the nature of the taking
leaves the property with no remaining economic value. In this instance, the CUP and
IUP specifically allow for use of the property as a campground, subject to conditions.
None of the conditions prohibit use of the property as a campground. Even if they did,
the R-lb zoning district allows other economically viable uses of the property. There is
no regulatory taking.
8. Wapiti Park argues that the conditions recommended by staff are illegal because
they have no relation to the use of the building as an office, restaurant, bar, laundry and
gathering place.
3
The conditions recommended by staff fall into two categories: conditions intended to
bring the use of Wapiti Park into compliance with state law and the terms of the 1984
CUP; and conditions addressing public health, safety and welfare issues related to the use
of the campground and store building. For instance, the store building includes a
restaurant, bar, laundry and restrooms, all of which generate waste water which goes into
the onsite septic system. Staffl s recommendation that compliance of the septic system
with state standards be verified is directly related to the use of the building. Similarly,
the building generates solid waste and debris, thus the recommended condition for a
debris management plan. Finally, the recommended condition requiring compliance with
outstanding violations identified by the Department of Health relate directly to conditions
in the building. Far from being irrelevant or immaterial to the use of the building, as
Wapiti Park maintains, these conditions are directly related to use of the building.
9. Wapiti Park argues that the regulation of campgrounds is preempted by the State
of Minnesota and delegated to the Minnesota Department of Health.
Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 327, regulates manufactured home parks and camping areas.
Section 327.16 of that Chapter requires that a campground obtain a permit from the
Department of Health, but goes on the provide that:
such approval does not relieve the applicant from securing building permits in
municipalities that require permits or from complying with any other municipal
ordinance or ordinances, applicable thereto, not in conflict with this statute.
The State Attorney General has specifically advised that:
municipalities have the power to regulate trailer coach parks where the municipal
ordinances are not in conflict with Sections 327.14 to 327.28. Op. Att'y Gen.,
238i, September 21, 1956.
By its express terms, the Statute allows municipal regulation of campgrounds if not in
conflict with the state statute. Requiring a CUP for a campground and requiring
compliance with Chapter 327 as a condition of the CUP is not in conflict with the statute.
We are confident that the city has the authority through its land use ordinances to provide
for appropriate locations for campgrounds, to require land use approvals for
campgrounds, to require compliance with the standards of the city's land use ordinances
and to impose reasonable conditions consistent with those standards.
10. Wapiti Park argues that the city has no authority to revoke an IUP.
In this instance, the IUP for the store building expired pursuant to its terms on a particular
date, as authorized by statute, which date was ten years from the date of issuance. The
IUP has been extended on two occasions to a specific date and it expires on that date
unless extended. If those extensions expire, the IUP will expire by its terms, not by
revocation.
4
11. Wapiti Park argues, in a number of places, that a recreational camping area is not
constrained to temporary residents.
Chapter 327 defines "recreational camping area" as:
any area, whether privately or publicly owned, used on a daily, nightly, weekly or
longer basis for the accommodation of five or more tents or recreational camping
vehicles free of charge or for compensation.
The Statute also defines "recreational camping vehicle" as including the following:
• any vehicular, portable structure built on a chassis, designed to be used as a
temporary dwelling for travel, recreational and vacation uses;
• any structure designed to be mounted on a truck chassis designed for use as a
temporary dwelling for travel, recreation and vacation;
• any portable, temporary dwelling to be used for travel, recreation and
vacation, constructed as an integral part of the self-propelled vehicle; and
• any folding structure, mounted on wheels and designed for travel, recreation
and vacation use.
(Emphasis added.) The definition of "recreational camping area" specifically
incorporates the definition of "recreational camping vehicle." The definition of
"recreational camping vehicle" uses the term temporary when defining recreational
camping vehicles and, just as important, states that recreational camping vehicles must be
"designed" or "to be used" for "travel, recreation and vacation use." It is clear that these
definitions do not contemplate permanent residency in a recreational camping vehicle or
at a recreational camping area. This is also clear because Chapter 327 also regulates
manufactured home parks, which are designed and intended for permanent residency.
12. The balance of Wapiti Park's annotated notes on their January 18 presentation
challenge the findings of fact set forth in the proposed resolution for City Council
consideration regarding the IUP for the store building. Staff has reviewed the findings
again and still believes that the record in this matter supports these findings for City
Council consideration.
Wapiti Park concludes by suggesting that the city allow the IUP to continue without the
onerous conditions recommended. However, the only conditions that Wapiti Park will
apparently agree to, pursuant to their letter of December 20, 2010, is to maintain their
current hours of operation and to comply with the Minnesota Department of Health rules
and regulations.
As set forth above, staff believes that the City Council has the authority to require
compliance with the conditions of the 1984 CUP. This CUP was validly approved and
Wapiti Park is entitled to continue the use as long as the conditions set forth in the CUP
are observed. The legal nonconforming use status of Wapiti Park is subject to the
conditions of the CUP, and Wapiti Park is not entitled to ignore those conditions. Failure
to comply with the conditions of the CUP subjects the use to the possibility of revocation
of the CUP, which would terminate Wapiti Park's legal nonconforming use status and
render the use illegal. However, revocation of the CUP is not before the City Council at
this point.
The issue before the City council is whether to grant an IUP for the store building at
Wapiti Park for an additional ten years. Staff believes that failure of Wapiti Park to
verify the functionality of the onsite septic system which serves the store building, failure
to present a debris management plan for solid waste generated from the store building,
and failure to submit evidence of compliance with outstanding violations identified by the
Department of Health are adequate grounds to deny an extension of the IUP. If an
extension of the IUP is denied, use of the store building would become illegal.
The campground, however, could continue to operate pursuant to its 1984 CUP. As
noted above, that CUP is valid as long as its conditions are observed. If the conditions of
the CUP are not being complied with, the city could commence revocation proceedings
as provided in Section 30-659 of the city code.
GP:2943649 vl
6
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~la~l~~
Allard, Tina ~-~,~.~ (~, 2,
Subject: FW: Tonight
From: Adam Kaatz [mailto:AKaatz@wayzatalawgroup.com]
Sent: Monday, March 21, 2011 2:02 PM
To: Beck, Peter K.
Subject: Tonight
Mr. Beck,
I am trying my best to get a hold of you because I have a problem regarding this evening's Elk River City Council
meeting. I just got back from the Doctor where I was told I have both strep throat and a sinus infection. Needless to say, I
am in tough shape.
I was wondering if you would be open to continuing our matter until the next meeting of the council. I assure you, I am not
trying to play games with either you or the Council.
Please contact me as soon as you have a moment.
Thanks Peter,
Adam Kaatz
Adam Kaatz
Associate Attorney
Wayzata Law Group, LLC
1907 E. Wayzata Blvd., Suite 170
Wayzata, MN 55391
Tel: 952.475.0910
Fax: 952.476.4447
akaatz(c~wayzatalawgroup.com
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